Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2008

Brief Comments on an Intermediate Position
Kent Greenawalt
Columbia Law School, kgreen@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law and Politics Commons, and the Religion Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Kent Greenawalt, Brief Comments on an Intermediate Position, 20 REGENT U. L. REV. 317 (2008).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/3360

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu, rwitt@law.columbia.edu.

BRIEF COMMENTS ON AN INTERMEDIATE POSITIONt
Kent Greenawalt*
I am going to start with some clarifications about how I see this
topic. Some of what I say may be a bit repetitive, but I think it can be
helpful. I do not see this subject as mainly about the force of the
Establishment Clause.1 With Judge McConnell, I think there is a big
difference between promoting a religious position, let's say, which I think
teaching creationism is, and deciding some moral or political issue based
on a religious judgment, such as whether there should be restrictive
abortion law. And I do not think this is a question of whether anyone
should be restricting advocacy in religious terms. The question is
whether people should ideally restrain themselves in some way.
It is not a question of whether religion should be a private matter.
Religious perspectives could be used to critique cultural values, urged as
a basis for personal lives, even if those perspectives are not used to
advocate political positions in the way that is in controversy. It is not a
question, as Professor Audi has explained, as to whether one could
explain one's religious views as they bear on a topic, like welfare, samesex marriage, or abortion; and among co-believers this kind of discussion
might be the main discussion, even though in advocacy in the public
realm there would be an attempt to rely on public reasons. It is not a
question of whether religion is going to influence people's judgments and
advocacies; of course it is. Nobody could completely divorce themselves
from their religious views. It is a question of how people should try to
decide things and of how they should advocate. And it is also not a
question of whether it is sometimes prudent or strategically helpful to
make nonreligious arguments. The answer to that is yes. The issue is
whether there is some principle of restraint about making religious
arguments-some principle that applies to this public spheresuggesting that it would always be inappropriate, or at least prima facie
inappropriate, to make such arguments.
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Now, one could approach this topic from one's own religious
perspectives or from what one might call detached political philosophy
that does not rely on any particular religious view. Most discussions of
the topic are in this latter category. We might think that there are some
principles that are applicable to all liberal democracies. I think that is
Rawls's view. 2 I think it is Professor Audi's view, as well. Or, one might
think that it matters what the historical time and place is. The typical
discussions of this topic are either about all liberal democracies or are
arguments that bring in the Establishment Clause in a strong way.
The forms of advocacy that people talk about are typically tied to
the bases of decision, and the idea is if you should not advocate to other
people on a certain ground, if you are a legislator or a voter, you also
should not be deciding on that same ground. So, typically the bases for
decision are linked to forms of advocacy in the positions that people take.
And, typically, it is assumed that the appropriate limits are the same for
officials and for citizens who are advocating in the public realm.
It is commonly assumed, and this has not been touched on yet, that
if religious grounds should not be the basis for advocacy, then neither
should some other grounds-non-rational grounds, controversial ideas of
the good, or, most influentially, other comprehensive views. So,
according to Rawls, if you cannot rely on a religious argument, you
should not rely on Benthamite utilitarianism either.3 Now, just in
passing, the Benthamite utilitarian would need to give up a lot less of
what he would be advocating about a particular position than would
many religious believers if both of them restrain themselves from relying
on their comprehensive views.
Now, it is often said that there is a line between issues that warrant
this kind of self-restriction and those that do not. Rawls talks about
constitutional essentials and basic issues of justice as being the ones that
call for the restraint. 4 And, we have heard Professor Audi talk about
coercive measures as being the sort of crucial category.
My own position is an intermediate one. I think there are reasons of
fairness and political stability to rely on grounds, to seek grounds that
have force or should have force for everyone in the society. But, I also
think there are reasons of liberty and fairness to let people rely upon and
advocate the reasons that they think are most persuasive. So, I think
this is a genuine dilemma with substantial arguments on each side. I do
2 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 212-54 (1993).
3 Id.; see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 23-33 (Harvard Univ. Press
2005) (1971) (discussing Benthamite utilitarianism).
4 See RAWLS, supra note 2, at 62 ("There is no reason, then, why any citizen, or
association of citizens, should have the right to use the state's police power to decide
constitutional essentials or basic questions ofjustice as that person's, or that association's,
comprehensive doctrine directs.").
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not think either side has a knockdown argument that just sort of
destroys the other side.
I doubt if there is one set of principles for all liberal democracies. I
think time, place, and cultural heritage are important, so what I am
speaking to is here and now in the United States. I think there should be
more restraint for officials than for ordinary citizens. There are a lot
more citizens than officials, so the liberty interest in freedom is much
more substantial when one thinks of citizens. Officials are much more
used to saying less than they fully believe when giving reasons that fit
political conditions. Asking officials not to publicly advocate political
measures in religious terms is, I think, a pretty modest restraint.
The idea that the same restraint should be placed on advocacy and
for decisions is also one that I disagree with. What we are talking about
here is reciprocal self-restraint. I restrain myself, but in return you do
the same thing. Now, it is very hard to know how anybody else is
actually reaching a decision, but it is not hard to know what they are
saying. Therefore, if we did accept some kind of reciprocal restraint, and
for me it is only for officials, on religious discourse, it would be fairly
easy to know whether somebody is complying with it or not, and I think
it is a solid basis for some kind of reciprocal understanding. Whereas, I
see making the decisions as quite different.
I also think there are significant differences among officials. I
believe judges are under more restraints than legislators, for instance.
And, I am wondering whether Judge McConnell thinks that it would be
appropriate for himself as a judge to rely on an explicitly theological
argument based on his conception of God to reach a judicial decision now
in the society. I think that would be pretty clearly inappropriate, but I
see the restraint as being significantly less for legislators.
Now, insofar as religious grounds should not be the basis for
advocacy, I think the same should be true about other comprehensive
views. But, I am very troubled by how one draws the line between when
reliance is on a comprehensive view and when it is not, whether reliance
is on religious views or not. And, I think natural law provides a good
example of something that is right on the borderline. I could go into that
in more detail, but I will not right now.
I am skeptical about the line between coercive laws and other
political decisions and between constitutional essentials and basic issues
of justice and other issues. The status of the fertilized embryo is crucial
for both the issue of abortion and for funding for stem cell research. A
restrictive abortion law does involve coercion. Not funding stem cell
research does not involve coercion. I think it would be very puzzling to
think that the grounds and the advocacy as to one of those issues should
be significantly different than the grounds that we think are appropriate
for the other of the two issues.
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I do not think the government as such should be promoting religion.
And, on clear Establishment Clause issues, I tend to be on the
disestablishment or separationist side. But, I see reliance on religious
grounds where the object is not to promote religion or endorse religion as
quite different. So, I do not follow those who advocate this fairly strict
reliance on very public reasons, but I arrive at my kind of mixed
intermediate position.
Thank you.

